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Since it became a united country, Italy was looked at with keen eyes by foreign economists, economic 
historians and policy-makers. They wanted to see whether it would be possible for the economy of a 
country which had in the XVII and XVIII century regressed to the role of agricultural raw material 
exporter after having been the premier site of European industry, trade and especially finance, in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, to redress itself and join the industrial revolution making good use of 
its population and territory, which gave it the potential to be among the great powers of Europe.  
In this paper several instances of this are considered, focusing on foreign observers who concerned 
themselves with the Italian economy at different stages of its development. An attempt is made to see 
what influence their opinions had on Italian economic debate and Italian policy-making. 
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  1.   Introduction 
Since it became a united country, Italy was looked at with keen eyes by foreign 
economists, economic historians and policy-makers. They wanted to know whether the 
economy of a country which had in the XVII and XVIII century regressed to the role of 
agricultural raw material exporter after having been in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the 
premier site of European industry, trade and especially finance could redress itself and join the 
industrial revolution making good use of its population and territory, which gave it the potential 
to be among the great powers of Europe. 
By what means this would happen, following which model, was particularly interesting to 
foreign observers. Political unification was in itself regarded as a miracle, and other declining 
countries, or countries which had long smarted under foreign dominion, would take Italy as the 
example to imitate. Several started by adopting the Italian tricolour as their flag (let us just 
mention Hungary and Ireland). Sionists were also keen students of the Italian experience, as the 
return on the scene of an ancient people after 2000 years of division as a potential modern great 
power may augur well for an even older people who had for even longer been subjected to loss 
of land, dispersal and persecution. 
2.  Natural and unnatural development 
Therefore, the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards 
to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce. This order of things is so very natural, that in every 
society that had any territory, it has always, I believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands 
must have been cultivated before any considerable towns could be established, and some sort of coarse 
industry of the manufacturing kind must have been carried on in those towns, before they could well think of 
employing themselves in foreign commerce. 
But though this natural order of things must have taken place in some degree in every such society, it has, in 
all the modern states of Europe, been, in many respects, entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of 
their cities has introduced all their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for distant trade; and manufactures 
and foreign commerce together, have given birth to the principal improvements of agriculture. The manners 
and customs which the nature of their original government introduced, and which remained after that 
government was greatly altered, necessarily forced them into this unnatural and retrograde order (Smith 
2009). 
Adam Smith took the Italian Republics and States since the Middle Ages as archetypal 
examples of “this unnatural and retrograde mode of development.” Their example had infected 
all the countries of Europe which imitated them. Smith was not at all surprised to see that the 
Italian city states had been exposed to volatility of fortune and fatal decline. He was at pains to 
show that their decline had not been brought about by the discovery of America. Italy’s decline 
had if anything preceded that event and Italy had somewhat recovered, after America’s 
discovery, while Spain and Portugal declined. 
For my purpose in this essay it is enough to note that Smith thought that the little States of 
the Italian peninsula, which had experienced a meteoric rise in the early Middle Ages and a fast 
decline afterwards, had introduced the unnatural mode of development, avoiding what he 
considered the natural one, which did not depend on the vagaries and volatility of foreign 
 
5commerce and plunder (the latter included in the category of primitive capital accumulation) as 
capital accumulation began in agriculture and proceeded to industry through reinvested savings 
and finally extended to foreign trade. 
Adam Smith’s model of natural development had a profound impact on economists and 
politicians all over the world. Among them were foreign students of the Italian economy, who, 
usually after having visited the Peninsula or having lived there for an extended period of time, 
reflected on Italy’s decline. 
Smith also influenced the Italians who engineered Italy’s comeback as a political and 
economic power, in the middle of the XIX century. The size of the country mattered to them, 
because it might permit a more stable and durable growth experiment, which ought to be based 
on a modern agriculture affording a degree of capital accumulation sufficient to permit the 
installation of modern industry. Hence their strive to unite the country.  
Thus, the first seventeen years of the new Kingdom of Italy saw the governing elite (La 
Destra storica) applying Adam Smith’s “natural development” model. For them, agricultural 
modernization came before industrialization. 
3.  Industry-led development or balanced growth?  
The Italian governing elites, especially after the Destra storica lost power in 1876, opted 
for industrialization at all costs as a necessary condition for increased international political 
power. David Ricardo won the day against Adam Smith. But in Italy perhaps a bit later than in 
other Continental European countries, Ricardian free trade gave way to protectionism as a 
necessary condition for industrialization. Not all foreign observers were sure it was the right 
choice to make. British observers, of course, advised that Italy join free trade Europe. Richard 
Cobden had made, earlier on in the century, a very successful tour of Italy preaching just that.  
The Piedmontese adopted free trade before unification, especially to obtain capital and 
direct investments from France and Britain, and then extended it to the heavily protected South 
after unification. Cavour, ever the great realist, did not declare unilateral free trade. Rather, he 
signed a large number of trade treaties with the principal powers with which Italy, and before it, 
the pre-unification States, had or hoped to have important commercial relations. 
The Southern Kingdom, a couple of decades after the Bourbon King had been removed to 
safety and temporary exile by Nelson’s fleet to escape from revolutionary Naples, had, on the 
contrary, chosen the model of American protectionism, preached by Alexander Hamilton and 
imitated, in the German States, by Friederich List’s Zollverein. This caused the enmity of the 
British. As the Florentine and Genoese had done in earlier centuries, their merchants had 
thoroughly exploited all the potentialities the Southern Kingdom offered in the way of imports 
and exports. In particular, British merchants had virtually monopolised the export of sulphur 
which was extracted, by primitive methods and with much human suffering, in the mines owned 
by Sicilian noblemen. Sulphuric acid was considered essential for industrialization and its price 
went through a veritable bubble in the early Thirties. After a few years, the bubble burst and the 
price declined as fast as it had risen, causing intense economic and social distress (Giura 1973). 
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government in 1838 chose to stabilize the slumping price of sulphur by restricting exports, 
limiting them by one third and auctioning the rights to the Sicilian sulphur mines, taking them 
away from de facto British control and assigning them to a newly formed monopoly run by a 
French company (in which the Duchess of Berry, sister of the Neapolitan King, was rumoured 
to have an interest).  
The British government reacted, after representations were made by British merchants to 
their government and to their MPs, by a very open threat of naval intervention, made by 
Viscount Palmerston, the Foreign minister, who did not hesitate to transform it into the actual 
seizing of Neapolitan merchant vessels in the open seas. They were taken to Malta awaiting for 
the dispute to be resolved, while other ships under the Neapolitan flag were blockaded in Corfu 
and the commander of the British fleet was told to be ready to blockade the Gulf of Naples. This 
act of open imperialist bullying, an almost perfect case of gunboat diplomacy, was ordered in 
disregard of the British crown’s legal experts’ advice. It was, however, presented by Palmerston 
under the clothes of a doctrinary dispute between protectionists and free traders. The “objective 
principles of modern economic science” were wheeled out in defence of the status quo with the 
sulphur mines in the letter the British foreign secretary wrote to the Neapolitan King, after the 
latter had claimed his sovereign right to impose a monopoly on an economic activity conducted 
in his domains and of treating foreigners in a different manner to his own subjects. 
In countries where Government is arbitrary and despotic and subject to no responsibility or control, it may 
often happen that caprice, want of political knowledge, prejudice, private interest, or undue influence, may 
procure the promulgation of unjust and impolitic edicts, inflicting much injury upon the people of such state, 
interfering with the legitimate industry of individuals, deranging the natural transactions of commerce and 
causing great detriment to private interests and to national prosperity (published in Giura 1973). 
Palmerston then proceeded to draw an essential difference between a state monopoly and 
one granted by a sovereign to an individual.  
No doubt royal monopolies are [...] very objectionable ways of raising a revenue. They interfere injuriously 
with private enterprise, prevent the full development of the natural commercial resources of the Nation, and 
check the consequent increase of the public revenue; but in all the countries where the science of Political 
Economy has been imperfectly understood, such monopolies have constituted one of the sources of income 
for the Crown (ibid.). 
However scientifically and practically wrong they might be, he noted, state monopolies 
were not prohibited under the treaty of Commerce signed between Naples and Great Britain in 
1816. But the case of sulphur was different, he affirmed, because the sulphur trade had been 
completely private from the start on both trading sides, and the imposition of a monopolistic 
restriction was a serious prejudice to the rights of British merchants and Her Majesty’s 
government had every right to come to their help. 
Palmerston made an additional didactic remark to his opponent: the Neapolitan 
government “appears to imagine that sulphur is an article found only in Sicily, and that 
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extensively required for various uses.”  
Sulphur, on the contrary, is to be found in many parts of the world and the persistence of 
the Sicilian monopoly, Palmerston affirmed, will bring other supplies into cultivation and the 
price will fall. He concluded that: 
When this result is accomplished the Government of Naples may perhaps regret that it allowed itself to 
listen to a scheme suggested by individual cupidity, which can only be carried into effect by sacrificing the 
interests of the many to the avarice of the few, which violates the national faith, and which must involve the 
Crown of Naples in a difference with a Power, whose fleet and armies have protected and preserved for that 
Crown the very island where the subjects of that Power are now about to be exposed to treatment oppressive 
and unjust (ibid.). 
Thus, Palmerston accused the Neapolitan crown of being scientifically backward and 
incorrect, politically offensive, ungrateful, and threatened that it could be also easily proven to 
be militarily weak compared to Britain. 
The Neapolitan response was fast in coming, in a letter personally dictated and signed by 
King Ferdinand. There, the King showed his ire at being defined politically despotic and 
ignorant of economic theory. He wrote that his country did not take lessons in Political economy 
from anyone, least of all England, as it had been the birthplace of economists like Genovesi, 
Galiani, Broggia, all earlier and just as great as the most eminent economists in the world. And 
he stated flatly that Palmerston was also wrong in his arguments about monopoly, and that he 
had been contradicted even by his own legal advisers. 
The ebullient and arrogant foreign secretary, however, was not to be deterred by this 
display of theoretical and argumentative prowess. He also had a personal axe to grind with the 
Neapolitan crown, as Carlo di Borbone, a cadet brother of the king, had married Penelope 
Smith, a beautiful Irish commoner who was Palmerston’s niece; for marrying beneath his rank, 
Carlo had promptly been disowned by his brother and left without means of support, to fend for 
himself and his wife in London. 
Palmerston, fired by political, ideological and personal motivations, ordered the British 
fleet to cruise out of Malta and seize all Neapolitan merchant vessels they found, to seize them 
also in Mediterranean ports, like Corfu, and finally to appear in all its persuasive strength in the 
Gulf of Naples. In private letters Palmerston also mentioned his determination to blockade the 
Kingdom of Naples altogether from the sea. 
The Neapolitan government appealed to other Italian princes, to the continental powers of 
the Congress of Vienna, to France. It received general sympathy, and expressions of readiness to 
mediate, but not much else. 
In the end, mediation managed to bring the dispute to a lengthy resolution. In fact, as J. 
Goodwin, British consul in Naples, wrote in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society in 1842, 
the British had made sure that the Bourbon king would take theoretical free trade lectures 
seriously: “Reprisals were made upon Neapolitan commerce by the British fleet in the 
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dissolved by a Royal decree of 1st July, 1840.” 
After this ideological-military spat, the Bourbon dynasty never recovered the special 
relationship it had enjoyed with London. The Kingdom of Naples became, for the British, the 
scourge of Europe, as William Gladstone famously called it in 1850. 
The Neapolitans were utterly defeated in their attempt to behave as a European power of 
the first rank. In economic terms, the defeat was less brutal, but the political implications of this 
demonstration of British imperialism were profound, for no other Italian State tried to go the 
protectionist way after that. Cavour pursued, as is known,  free trade, in Piedmont. After his 
death in 1861, his political heirs extended the free trade regime to the whole of Italy, including 
the Southern provinces where protection had lingered on and where the effects of free trade 
were devastating, also induced by the new kingdom’s choice of a monetary standard which 
over-valued the Lira. 
4.  Werner Sombart on Italian commercial policy 
A very lucid analysis of Italy’s commercial policy since unification was provided in the 
early nineties of the XIX century by Werner Sombart (Sombart 1896). 
He had no hesitation in stating that in his view, the new Kingdom had chosen the wrong 
path to development by extending Piedmont’s free trade to the whole of the country and that 
Cavour, had he lived to govern the country he had so cleverly put together, would have not done 
that, because he knew that what was a good policy choice for a small country like Piedmont 
would not be appropriate for a large and uneven one such as united Italy. Sombart provided 
statistics on the level of protection that existed in the various kingdoms before unification, 
which clearly showed that the Bourbon Kingdom was the most protected one. He remarked that 
Italy before unification could not adopt a custom’s union like the German Zollverein, because it 
would have meant giving economic leadership over the whole Italian peninsula to the Austrian 
Hungarian government, the opposite of what the Risorgimento was about. 
He provided statistics to show how the economy of the South had wilted in the years after 
unification, being subjected to the harsh winds of free trade. And how the whole country’s 
imports had swollen in the same years, while exports remained stagnant. 
He noted that in 1860 Italy had some industrial plants but could not be said to have an 
industrial sector, even in its most developed parts. He added that the shift to protectionism, in 
the 1870s, was gradual and did not lead, but followed, similar policy changes which were 
decided by neighbouring countries, in particular by France. He very perceptively remarked how 
close had been the integration between the economies of the two “Latin sisters,” and how 
economically painful would therefore be for Italy the commercial war declared against France in 
1887, how Italy was led into it by France’s decision to abandon Napoleonic free trade in 1873, 
how it was also influenced by high foreign politics. 
An equally perceptive set of remarks he made on Italy’s decision to industrialize, under 
the Sinistra governments. He was convinced that the Italians had gone over to industrialization 
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seemed to go hand in hand and all leading countries had become industrialised. This prevalence 
of politics over economics seemed altogether reasonable to him. He believed that if a country 
stuck to “natural” economic activities dictated by geography and natural endowments, it would 
lose control over its own destiny, and be exposed to the vagaries of the international cycle, but 
that once that path was abandoned, protectionist policies required very careful planning and 
could easily misfire. Accordingly, he noted that the earliest duties had been imposed on foreign 
trade by the Italian government not to promote industry or agriculture, but mainly to boost fiscal 
revenues in a country where taxation was difficult to impose and manage. 
When Sombart wrote his article, the great industrial spurt of the late Nineties and early 
XX century had not yet begun in Italy. It is with the industrialisation of the 1880s he therefore 
dealt. He did not have any objection to the Italian decision to provide heavy protection to the 
steel industry. It seemed clear to him that no industrialization effort could take place in a large 
country like Italy which was not based on a national steel production, even if the country did not 
have coal. He expressed admiration for the steel works, which were built by Stefano Breda in 
Terni. To him it was evidence that Italians could realize large scale state of the art projects in 
leading industrial sectors. 
But he was too good an economist not to notice the contradiction that existed between the 
return of convertibility by the Lira brought about by the Sinistra government in 1882 and the 
negative consequences it had on the competitiveness of the Italian economy, particularly of the 
newly born industry. He noted that an inconvertible currency worked like protective measures 
and that their effect was predicated on domestic prices rising earlier and faster than domestic 
wages, shifting income distribution in favour of capital and against labour. 
Smith, Palmerston and Sombart are excellent examples of the mix of ideology, high level 
economic theory and more down to earth considerations with which foreigners have 
traditionally approached the reality of modern Italy. 
Further examples can be found in Gerschenkron’s crossing of swords with Rosario Romeo 
on primitive accumulation, the role of German banks in Italian industrialisation and the 
misconceived protection of basic industries, in Vera Lutz’s polemic about the Italian 
government’s Southern industrialization policy, Andrew Shonfield’s and Posner and Woolf’s 
admiration for Italian publicly owned industry, and the more recent debate about small scale 
industry and industrial districts, inspired by Brusco and Becattini but made popular among 
world economists by Piore and Sabel and even a political science analysis of North-South 
difference as the one proposed by Robert Putnam. All are really looking at the different facets of 
the same subject, as we shall try to show in what follows. 
5.  Bonnefon Craponne, a contemporary witness of turn of the century Italian 
“Big Push” 
After an early belief, shared by many foreigners and Italians, that Southern soil hid 
fabulous riches, and that an enlightened and efficient administration would bring them to 
fruition, the realization of Southern backwardness hit foreign observers as it did Italians, and 
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from abroad for the next one hundred and fifty years. In the eyes of foreigners, the coincidence 
of a rapidly modernizing North and an increasingly backward South made the Italian growth 
experience a Sonderweg, a special case. Many foreign observers thought it could be solved if the 
Southern regions specialised in agriculture and tourism. After a much bigger case of economic 
renaissance, that of Germany, filled the landscape, foreigners began considering whether 
integration with the German empire may be better for Northern Italy than special relations with 
France, which had been the experience of the previous two hundred years. Northern Italy was 
the region involved, as it was clear that there the Italian elites would conduct their experiment of 
rapid industrialization. 
Still, there was no widespread contemporary awareness by foreigners of the success of the 
Italian industrial spurt in the two decades leading to the First World War. After the war, keener 
observers took note of what had happened but the pre-war and wartime growth of Italy’s new 
industrial structure was overshadowed by the more urgent problems posed by Italy’s huge 
foreign indebtedness and by the need to reconvert the new industrial structure to the post war 
world economic conditions. 
There were exceptions, however. Perhaps the most interesting among pre-war observers 
was Louis Bonnefon Craponne, a French silk producer based in Piedmont, who was the first 
chairman of the Unione industriale of Torino and later of the Confederation of Italian Industry. 
He published in Paris, in 1916, what can be considered perhaps the best contemporary work on 
the decade of rapid growth Italy experienced at the turn of the century, “L’Italie au travail,” a 
book which had been written before the outbreak of WWI (Bonnefon Craponne 1916). The man 
was highly competent, a graduate of one of the elite Paris grandes écoles, the Haute Ecole en 
Sciences Commerciales, a true lover of his adopted country, a not uncritical admirer of what the 
Italians had managed to do especially in the ten years of what we now call the Giolittian 
economic miracle. His book is an extremely lively, but well documented and statistically backed 
description of the growth trajectory some of the most successful sectors of Italian industry 
experienced since unification. It included a very thoughtful chapter on la Questione meridionale, 
clearly inspired by a man the author thought very highly of, Francesco Saverio Nitti. He was 
however able to distance himself from Nitti’s passionate approach to the subject. 
Bonnefon started as a silk producer, closely connected to the Lyon silk market, but then 
moved on, to take part in the explosive boom of the Italian automobile industry in the first 
decade of the XX century. Naturally, his chapters on silk cocoon production, the silk industry 
and on the auto industry are particularly brilliant, but he is extremely well informed and 
informative on other sectors, such as the hydroelectric power industry. 
It is only through the brilliant pen of this French grand commis that we get a really 
pulsating feeling of what must have been the heady experience of fast growth in Northern Italy 
in the first decade of the last century. Just by quoting production levels in the most dynamic 
sectors and by giving a body to those figures through extremely competent description of the 
production processes adopted, of the technology levels at which Italian industry was able to rise 
in such a short time, in sectors like automobiles, tyres and cables, hydro power, and even cotton 
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distance from Southern Italy, the essential role played by emigrants’ remittances in the Northern 
miracle, the problems with the young and militant workers’ unions, the pitfalls which lay in the 
future and which must be avoided for the miracle not to be aborted. 
Bonnefon also fully understood the dualism between large and small scale industry and 
vividly described the self-made former workers, the well educated engineers, or upper class 
former cavalry officers like Giovanni Agnelli, both types of industrialists sometimes coexisting 
in the same sectors. He did not overlook the workers, whose recent provenance from the 
peasantry he stressed, because of the advantages and disadvantages that rapid social change 
entails, which helped to explain why such hardworking people in the end were less productive 
than their French, British and German counterparts. Bonnefon was a positivist living in an age 
of positivists and in a city where that persuasion was rife, with people like Cesare Lombroso and 
Angelo Mosso. 
His book, in the original French edition, is very hard to find, although an incomplete copy 
can be downloaded from the Internet, offered by a Canadian university. A new French anastatic 
reprint has recently come out and, even better, an excellent translation into Italian was made and 
published in 1991 by the Unione industriale of Torino that Bonnefon founded, but has not been 
commercially distributed and is hard to find (Bonnefon Craponne 1991). For these reasons, 
Bonnefon Craponne is hardly a household name in Italy today. He certainly was not mentioned 
by either author in the Gerschenkron-Romeo debate. He does not appear in “Risorgimento e 
capitalismo” (Romeo 1959) nor in “Economic backwardness in historical perspective” 
(Gerschenkron 1962). Nor is he mentioned in the Index appended to a very important collection 
of essays Alberto Caracciolo put together, in 1969, under the title “La formazione dell’Italia 
industriale” (Caracciolo 1969). More recent works, like Castronovo’s history of FIAT, 
(Castronovo 2005) instead make full use of the book. Bonnefon’s book, however, is today 
known only to specialist historians, while it ought to have been among those suggested to 
university students of history, economics and engineering in the year of celebration of the 150th 
anniversary of the birth of modern Italy. His down to earth, yet vivid and scientifically 
cognizant prose has not aged at all in a century. Reading it calls back the enthusiasm of a decade 
essential to Italian economic and political history. 
6.  The ECA Country Study on Italy and its consequences on theory and 
policy-making 
What to make of the Italian mixed economy, with large scale industry chiefly owned and 
run by the State? This occupied foreigners after the Second World War, especially during and 
after the Italian economic miracle. Before that, however, foreign advisers were involved in plans 
for the reconstruction of the Italian economy after the war and its adaptation to the new free 
trade environment created by the Bretton Woods Agreements. The launch of the Marshall Plan 
and its application to Italy gave rise to a famous dispute between the “keynesian” US 
administrators of the Plan and the Italian authorities, headed by the Central Bank and its then 
governor, the distinguished economist Luigi Einaudi, soon to become president of the Republic; 
the latter thought foreign financial aid should be destined to help the stabilization of the Italian 
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according to them, had structural causes. After the Marshall Plan was launched, the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA) staff published a “country study” on Italy (ECA 1949) 
which was sharply critical of the Italian post-stabilization policy choices, Italian economic 
policy-makers cleverly managed to mobilize conservative foreign economists like Friederich 
and Vera Lutz, who agreed with the Italian government’s set of priorities and policy sequencing. 
In due course the Italian authorities asked for foreign advice when Italy requested United 
Nations help to develop the South. Paul Rosenstein Rodan, Hollis Chenery, Richard Eckaus 
were consulted. That attracted foreign interest much more than what was happening to the 
industrialised North in the new environment of trade liberalization. The Northern “miracle” took 
foreigners largely by surprise, hence their interest in the mixed economy model, which had 
prevailed in Italy since the rescue of banks and industry in the 1930s. This model had admirers 
like Andrew Shonfield and Michael Posner as well as serious critics, like the already mentioned 
Friederich and Vera Lutz. 
The report by the administrators of the Marshall Plan, titled “Italy. Country Study” which 
appeared in February 1949 but was written in the last months of 1948, was slender in size but it 
proved to be the first mover in the post-war debate about what models of economic development 
ought to be applied to the case of Italy, the ideal starting point of the Gerschenkron-Romeo 
debate. It has been condescendingly called a product of “rough Keynesianism.” It certainly was 
keynesian to the core, but rough it was not. 
Among its authors, we only know for sure there was that Richard Bissell, who later 
acquired a not very positive fame for having planned the unfortunate Bay of Pigs expedition 
against Fidel Castro’s revolution. We also know that, like Bissell, the other authors were young 
and American. 
I have already mentioned how traumatic the appearance of this report was for the Italian 
governing elites, who had, starting from the authoritative advice and policy-making activities of 
Luigi Einaudi, governor of the Central Bank, Budget minister in De Gasperi’s cabinet and soon 
to become first full fledged president of the Italian Republic, devised a very different policy 
sequence to follow the stabilization of the Lira they had just brought about. De Gasperi and 
Einaudi had bet on the positive electoral consequences of their stopping in its tracks the inflation 
which had burned Italian monetary savings and the real value of the huge public debt inherited 
from Fascist War making. They won their bet. There were more people in favour of deflation 
than there were who attributed their unemployment to it. And the fact that inflation had 
destroyed the real value of cash earned through black market sales of all sorts of goods, like 
food products, did not inflame the losers into voting against the government, certainly did not 
persuade them to vote for the Left. 
The authors of the Country Study reported that inflation had been initiated by the Italian 
authorities, when they had allowed banks to sell the large holdings of government debt they had 
been forced to absorb during the war and to lend the proceeds to their commercial and industrial 
clientele. The authorities, especially Treasury minister Epicarmo Corbino, an extremely 
obdurate economist who believed in free competition whatever the cost, had repealed all rules 
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result that industrial production and imports grew because pent up demand for goods but also of 
speculative inventory accumulation. A wild stock exchange boom also ensued, another product 
of easy credit. 
When Corbino’s influence was finally neutralised, open inflation was rampant and it took 
Einaudi and Menichella, who had been the first director general of IRI before the war and 
became governor of the Central Bank after Einaudi, to put up a joint effort to fight it back. 
Stabilization of the Lira was achieved at the cost of deflation, a deflation which was only 
mitigated by a large devaluation of the Italian currency and by special government intervention 
to rescue the engineering industry with subsidies. 
All these aspects, positive and negative, were mentioned in a couple of brilliant articles by 
the young Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1948a; 1948b), who had earned an economics degree in 
Trieste just before the war and had deep knowledge of the Italian economy, and who wrote just 
after the stabilization had been successfully performed. 
Hirschman worked for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. He was as a result 
careful with words, but he did not mince them either.  
Since one of the articles appeared in the American Economic Review, the authors of the 
Country Study probably read it. Hirschman had written his papers after having spent time in 
Italy to gain information. There are good chances that he had met his Marshall Plan colleagues. 
The  Country Study was written in the same vein as Hirschman’s articles. He had 
underlined the importance of the Lira devaluation for the success of stabilization. He 
emphasized the importance of “real” variables, like commodity prices, in dampening price rises 
in Italy after the autumn of 1947. And he also underlined the partial freeing of exporters’ foreign 
exchange earnings, which had been used to import raw materials and other essential products, 
rather than being parked in foreign bank accounts. 
The authors of the Country Study irked Italian policy-makers and conservative economists 
when they began their report by quoting the very high number of unemployed people who lived 
in the cities of the industrial North of Italy and affirming that increasing employment was the 
primary aim of economic policy. They thought that aim could not be achieved if the deflation 
following stabilization would be allowed to persist. A vigorous reflationary policy was 
mandatory also to allay the threat of Communism permanently. And they added that a massive 
dose of public investment was the only way of bringing it about, to substitute for weak 
consumption demand to be expected because of low wages and unemployment and especially 
for the extremely timid performance of private investment after the inflationary bubble had been 
successfully punctured by the authorities fast and determinate measures of mid 1947. Private 
entrepreneurs, wrote the Country Study, seemed not to have gained, after the resounding 
Christian democratic electoral victory of 18 April 1948, enough confidence that Communist 
takeover was definitively out of the picture to take out their own money and invest it in new 
productive capacity. In any case, private industry thought capacity utilization was still low 
because of the deflation following stabilization and that there was enough unused plant and 
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future. 
Public investment, the Country Study wrote in no uncertain tones, was therefore the only 
way to decrease present unemployment in the North and to increase productive capacity in the 
less immediate future, and avoid bottlenecks which would then appear in crucial and 
strategically important industrial sectors. Its authors also wrote that public investment could be 
financed by the ample funds made available by Marshall Aid and accumulated in the special 
Treasury counterpart account, where the proceeds of the sales of Marshall Aid goods were 
deposited. This was what the ECA programme had been devised for, they added. 
That is where the post-war dispute on models of development and capital accumulation 
began, much earlier than it was taken up by academic economists, as we recounted above. The 
keynesian economists of the ECA obviously had in mind a progenitor of what would later come 
to be known as the keynesian growth model, very similar to what Gerschenkron seemed to have 
in the back of his mind when he wrote his articles, some years later. Public investment to 
increase capacity and employ workers would be at its core. In the immediate post-war years, 
however, no primitive accumulation was required to realize it, unless Marshall Aid could be 
defined as primitive accumulation. Foreign aid replaced credit creation by German style banks 
which no longer existed or extraction of agricultural surplus through taxation of rich landowners 
or through relative price movements between industrial and agricultural goods which penalised 
the latter. 
The authors of the Country Study also wrote that, in order to boost fixed investment in 
infrastructure and new industrial capacity, publicly owned industry, whose size had been greatly 
increased in the 1930s through the creation of IRI to rescue large scale industry and banks 
which owned it, should be called to play the protagonist’s role, as IRI owned most of the firms 
capable of planning and executing large scale investment projects, to be financed with ECA 
funds. The Country Study remarked that IRI had not yet begun to plan a coordinated industrial 
effort such as the one now necessary for Italy to move to a fast growth trajectory, but that they 
ought to be asked to do it, now that resources to finance that giant effort were made available by 
the ECA. They thought no one in private industry had the resources and the size to replace IRI 
in this role.  
The Italian authorities, however, did not agree with the course traced by the ECA 
economists in the Country Study. They much preferred to spend the counterpart funds in gold 
and foreign exchange reserve accumulation, to give once again a solid base to the Italian 
monetary system. Some of them also believed that Italian unemployment was not caused by a 
deflation-induced fall in effective demand. They thought it was structural and could therefore 
not be quickly reabsorbed by a demand boost to be obtained by increasing industrial capacity 
through fixed investment and infrastructure building. 
They also feared that inflation was not permanently subdued and would be resurrected by 
a sudden increase in international commodity prices, leading to inventory speculation by Italian 
industrialists. 
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authors of the Country Study and the Italian economic authorities were both right. There had 
been both keynesian unemployment in Northern cities and disguised unemployment in 
agriculture all over Italy. The Korean War spurred another bout of speculative inventory 
accumulation by Italian firms and merchants, and the foreign reserves the Italian authorities had 
prudently piled up could be used to balance the country’s international accounts. 
But the war also boosted foreign demand for Italian industrial goods, and that caused 
employment and capacity utilization to rise without unduly pressuring wages. The low level of 
the Italian lira made Italian industry fully competitive with foreign producers. 
At the same time, IRI firmly placed itself at the core of the new Italian growth trajectory. 
It managed to close the historic gap that Italy showed in integral-cycle steel production, by 
building, against the violent hostility of private steel makers, who used scrap iron in electric 
steel mills, a new steel plant in Genoa with American machinery supplied by the Marhsall Plan. 
American refinery equipment was also obtained to build new oil refineries and re-equip existing 
ones, thus helping to close another historic trade gap, that caused by coal imports. Higher value 
refined oil products were exported and low valued ones were burnt as fuel in the thermoelectric 
plants also imported from America. Moreover, IRI engaged in a huge programme of motorway 
construction, while ENI, the other large publicly owned firm, found natural gas in the Po valley 
and built a complete pipeline network to make it available to Italian industry and reduce the fuel 
bill Italy paid to foreigners. 
Thus it was often the same men who had played down the advice of the young authors of 
the Country Study, who put the content of that advice into practice. As Gardner Ackley later 
remarked, there must have been plenty of keynesian unemployment in the late Forties to allow 
such a large and rapid supply increase in the Fifties, while millions of Italian workers had at the 
same time been migrating to Europe, the Americas and Australia. Full employment would 
finally show up, only in the North of the country, in the early Sixties, rapidly pushing up wages 
and causing a balance of payments crisis which Italy, now on the Bretton Woods fixed exchange 
rate standard, chose not to fight by devaluation. 
7.  Dualism in economic development 
In the 1970s, David Abulafia, a distinguished Cambridge economic historian, published 
his work on the Italian economy of the late Middle Ages, where he showed, with considerable 
success, that the dualism of the Italian economy, with a developed Centre-North and an 
underdeveloped South, could be traced back as far as the XIV century (Abulafia 1977). This 
was not as far fetched as what other scholars had done before him, to show that dualism in the 
Italian economy dated back to classical times. Arnold Toynbee, the most extreme among them, 
had written that the underdevelopment of Calabria was to be attributed to the revenge the 
Romans had taken on its autochthonous inhabitants and the devastation they had wrought on 
their homeland, after the Calabrians had sided with Hannibal (Toynbee 1965). 
Dualism, uneven development, is thus a concept which permeates Italian economic and 
social history. In our time it re-emerged in the 1950s, when a vigorous growth process finally 
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debate was started by an article which Vera Smith, an English economist married to the 
conservative German economist Friederich Lutz, published in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review in 1958 (Lutz 1958). 
The couple started visiting Italy for extended periods, at the invitation of the Bank of Italy. 
What was the purpose the Italian authorities pursued by inviting them to work on the Italian 
economy, has been admirably reported by Paolo Baffi in a well known article some years ago 
(Baffi 1985). 
In the first article, in subsequent ones and finally in a book (Lutz 1962), Vera Lutz built a 
model of the Italian economy characterised by some pathological features, which in her opinion 
caused the divergence between North and the South to come about and to persist in time. 
Her articles coincided with the preliminary work for and then the launching of the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno, an institution which was Donato Menichella’s creature, was inspired by 
Roosevelt’s TVA, and was supplied with large resources to build public works and 
infrastructures in the Southern regions, with the declared aim of bridging the gulf that existed 
between economic conditions in the two parts of Italy. In the same years, the Vanoni Plan was 
also launched, with the aim of speeding up growth rates in the whole of Italy but in particular in 
the more backward regions. Foreign economists were recruited to help with both efforts. 
Vera Lutz’s articles had the aim of inserting doubts into the minds of the Italian governing 
elites, who were swinging in favour of both intervention plans, as to the soundness of their 
theoretical foundations.  
They started from classical and keynesian premises. She, on the contrary, based her 
reasoning on strictly neoclassical principles.  
According to her analysis, the glaring dualism which persisted between North and South 
as far as levels and rates of growth were concerned, was the result of one simple fact: large scale 
industry, mostly located in the North, was dominated by powerful unions, which imposed to the 
entrepreneurs much higher wage rates than the relative availability of factors of production in 
Italy justified. This artificial wage setting, dominated by a strong monopoly of labour resources 
exercised by the unions, compelled firms to use more capital intensive techniques than the ones 
labour availability in the economy would have suggested, thus inducing the economy to warrant 
a less than full employment demand for labour. 
Large scale industry, as a result, did not grow as fast as it might have, and labour supply 
was partly employed by small scale firms, which were allowed, by the relative weakness or even 
absence of unions from their shop floors, to pay much lower wages and ensure much worse 
working conditions than those prevailing in large scale industry.  
The Italian economy, because of the presence of powerful unions, was therefore suffering, 
according to Vera Lutz, from an inadequate growth rate, a dualistic wage structure and a highly 
dualistic economic structure, where very capital intensive big industrial plants were surrounded 
by a plethora of small firms, where big industry paid higher wages than they should have, labour 
conditions were very different in the two sectors, and small scale firms were concentrated in the 
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would have been justified by the labour supply of the country was another unfortunate result of 
the excess wage rates secured by the unionised labour force of the big industry sector. This led 
to monopoly and excess profits. 
Monopolistic wage setting in the large scale industry sector thus led, according to Vera 
Lutz, to monopolistic prices and behaviour on the part of the entrepreneurs in the same sector. 
Resources were siphoned off from the rest of the economy and starved it of necessary capital.  
How to get out of this dangerous impasse in which the Italian economy had been cornered 
by too strong unions? According to Mrs. Lutz, the answer was simple: wages in the capital 
intensive sector had to be kept from rising for a time long enough to allow the relative reduction 
of capital intensity in that sector and an increase of its growth rate so that the sector would start 
again absorbing labour and thus reduce the size of the backward small firm sector. 
On the contrary, if wages resumed their rise in the capital intensive sector, its capital 
intensity would grow further and the growth rate of the whole economy would slow down, 
advantages of capital intensity and of high wages would be enjoyed only by capitalists and 
workers in the high wage, capital intensive sector. Geographical and sectoral dualism far from 
declining, would probably increase. 
It is clear that the implications of Vera Lutz’s analysis for the whole growth strategy the 
Italian leadership was launching aided by very eminent foreign advisors, from Paul Rosenstein 
Rodan to Hollis Chenery, to Harvey Leibenstein and with the help of large soft loans from the 
World Bank, were profound. 
Had her line of reasoning been accepted, the first move on the part of Italian politicians 
should have been to try and break the hold the unions had on wages in the capital intensive 
sector. 
Without this preliminary action, all attempts to increase employment levels by public 
works and direct investment by state industry were destined to meet only small and short lived 
success. 
If one adds that a dualistic economy would also work, according to Mrs. Lutz, to increase 
agricultural prices and depress industrial prices, Southern excess supply of labour could only be 
relieved by mass emigration to the North, investment in employment-creating public works and 
even directly in new industries in the South being largely useless. 
It is thus not surprising to see that Vera Lutz’s articles were subjected to extremely heavy 
criticism on the part of economists who did not accept neoclassical theory. The first line of 
criticism was taken by Luigi Spaventa, then a very young and brilliant Cambridge-trained 
economist, alone or writing with Luigi Pasinetti (Spaventa and Pasinetti 1960) who also rose to 
international eminence in later years and with Gardner Ackley, an American keynesian 
economist, who had good knowledge of the Italian economy (he would later serve as US 
ambassador in Rome) (Spaventa and Ackley 1962).  
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theoretical premises, to which they also added the results of Sylos Labini’s work on oligopoly. 
Their model yielded results opposite to those of Lutz’s: it was oligopoly in the modern part of 
the economy which reduced the growth rate of the whole economy and maintained the 
divergence between the modern and the backward parts. A reduction of oligopolistic powers, i.e. 
an increase of competition in the modern part of the economy, was thus required to raise the 
aggregate growth rate and reduce dualism. 
Other foreign economists, like Chenery and Leibenstein and especially Kindleberger, also 
contributed to the study of Italian dualism. Kindleberger used Arthur Lewis’s analysis of 
development with unlimited labour supply. He attributed to the exhaustion of excess labour 
supplies the end of the so-called “super-growth” the Italian economy had shown in late Fifties 
and until 1963. Sudden and very large wage rises had stopped the virtuous circle of Italian post-
war development.  
His work was criticised by Italian economists who noted, for instance, that in 1963 full 
employment had been achieved only in Northern Italy, while unemployment persisted in the 
South. 
Eminent foreign economists were thus working, in the Fifties and early Sixties, to explain 
the Italian economy’s persistent dualism. It can be safely said that it was Mrs. Lutz who started 
the debate, and drove the discussions. And it can also be said, in retrospect, that her line of 
argumentation was the one which had the strongest influence on Italian public debate for years 
to come, in spite of the many theoretical weaknesses of her basic model. Double wage standards 
in different areas of the country and break up of union monopoly continue to be suggested as 
solutions to the dualism by which Italy is still affected, 150 years after unification. 
8.  Gerschenkron and Romeo on primitive accumulation and the “big push” 
While the “dualism in economic development” debate raged, an equally heated one 
involved two eminent economic historians, Alexander Gerschenkron and Rosario Romeo: they 
were soon joined by other Italian and foreign economic historians and economists.  
The debate focused on the role of capital accumulation in the crucial phase of economic 
development, which at the time was referred at as the “big push,” a strong acceleration in the 
rate of growth of an underdeveloped country which would finally allow it to break away from 
underdevelopment and take a fast growth path. 
More stalinist than the marxian economists whose views he challenged, though by no 
means a marxist himself, Romeo advanced the opinion that in the first fifteen years after 
unification, the Destra storica had adopted the correct approach in its attempt to bring Italy 
among developed countries in the shortest possible time. And that the politicians that had 
replaced the Destra had pursued the same strategy, whose core was the extraction of investable 
surplus from agriculture to shift it to infrastructure building and then to industry. This was a 
direct criticism of Antonio Gramsci’s view of the failed agricultural revolution as the key to 
understanding why united Italy had not experienced a bourgeois revolution. By not distributing 
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slow industrial development and the very slow and timid emergence of a modern bourgeoisie. 
Romeo’s view was it had been exactly the failure to distribute land that had allowed the 
government to extract the surplus from agriculture. Who could have kept poor peasants who had 
come into land ownership from eating all the product they were able to produce themselves? By 
keeping land in the hands of the landlord class, the Italian government had been able to tax 
landlords heavily, because agricultural wages had not been allowed to grow. With some 
justification, Romeo accused the Italian marxists of not having read enough classical political 
economy, to have directly shifted loyalties from pre-war idealism to marxism for purely 
political reasons (hatred of the fascist dictatorship which had plagued Italy for twenty years). In 
his opinion, “primitive accumulation,” a favourite expression of Italian marxists, had to be 
interpreted as the extraction of existing resources from a stagnant sector to invest them in a 
dynamic sector like industry or in indispensable public works, like the building of a railway 
network. The latter course was the one chosen by the Destra storica and it was a first 
indispensable step leading to a strategy of industrialization.  
Romeo was clearly inspired by the literature on growth theory and growth models 
developed in those years in British and American universities, by people like Joan Robinson, 
Ragnar Nurkse and Arthur Lewis. But he referred in particular to the articles on Italy 
Gerschenkron had published in English in Italian journals.  
Gerschenkron’s reaction to this peculiar use of his work was ambivalent. He praised 
Romeo and criticised his marxist opponents. But he also reaffirmed what he considered his more 
important views of the Italian experience with economic development. He thought that railway 
building, much as it had been useful to unite the country, had been very weak as a factor of 
development promotion, as most of the track and rolling stock had been imported. He thus 
believed that the meaningful growth strategy was that initiated in the 1890s, after the great 
banking crisis, by replacing the failed French-type banks with German banks, which had 
exported to Italy their banking model and directly promoted industrial investment, as they had 
done in Germany. In Italy they had not managed, however, to dispose of their industrial 
investments as easily as they had in Germany, recovering their financial resources for another 
round of investment, because of the shallowness and semi-permanent state of illiquidity of the 
Italian stock exchange. Gerschenkron also affirmed that the industrialization policy of the 
1880s, which had directly promoted the steel industry, by giving it huge resources and heavy 
protection, much as it might have promoted Italy’s status as a great power, from the economic 
point of view had been mostly a waste of resources, as it had penalised the much more 
promising engineering industry, which had been ineffectively protected and was made to bear 
the costs of expensive homemade iron and steel products. Gerschenkron also criticised the 
choice made in the 1880s to protect the textile industry, which was hardly an innovative 
industrial sector. 
Romeo had therefore used a partial and lopsided version of the Gerschenkron view, one 
which did not accept Gerschenkron’s criticism of the development strategy adopted by the 
Sinistra governments in the 1880s. Gerschenkron told him as much in a debate they had in 
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whole pre-fascist Italian governing class from marxist attacks. He based his reasoning on his 
own statistics of Italian GNP, which he rated were better than the ones constructed by the Italian 
national statistical institute, a claim which has stood the proof of time. 
9.  Small is beautiful, industrial districts and the “third Italy” 
In the 1970s and ‘80s, foreign observers were definitively confirmed in the opinion that 
Italy was a Sonderweg. Not only did the divergence between North and South persist. There 
emerged even a “Third Italy,” Italy’s answer to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, which seemed to 
defy and even negate world trends by promoting small scale industry and launching its products 
on world markets. This new historical turn received outsize interest, as foreign economists 
echoed the research of some of their Italian colleagues, who were studying what came to be 
known as “industrial districts,” singing the praises of “informal horizontal integration” among 
small firms which did not merge but remained self standing. Foreign economists joined their 
enthusiastic Italian colleagues in extolling the virtues of the “Central Italian” model of balanced 
and non-destructive industrial growth, based on small scale firms springing up in an 
environment where agricultural sharecropping had prevailed for centuries and local social and 
political institutions existed which favoured cohesive social choices. Foreign sociologists and 
political scientists were eager to jump on the band wagon, some of them like Robert Putnam 
even going back to medieval Italy’s experience with the “Comuni liberi” to explain why 
contemporary localised production methods based on social cohesion and cooperation had 
emerged in the Centre and North East regions (Putnam 1994). They contrasted this with what 
prevailed in the South, where Edward Banfield had several decades before found inspiration for 
his theory of “Mediterranean familism” (Banfield 1958). 
The Third Italy model was so successfully propagandised abroad by foreign social 
scientists that even politicians like Bill Clinton, when he was governor of Arkansas, came to 
inspect it directly, visiting towns like Reggio Emilia and Modena to see their small firms and 
their welfare institutions, like the famous infant schools of Reggio. 
10.  The new Italian decline 
After the end of the thirty year experience with post-Bretton Woods competitive 
devaluations, the Euro made it mandatory for economies like the Italian one, mostly wedded to 
labour intensive, technology poor goods, to control labour costs strictly and to increase 
productivity-enhancing fixed investment. Neither condition was respected. The marked slowing 
down of growth in Italy, after a previous decade of indifferent growth figures, has probably set 
the Italian economy on a path of steady decline, accentuated by the world crisis. 
It did not take foreign observers long to notice the change: the switch from celebration to 
deprecation has been swift and neat. However, the countries taking the centre of the stage in the 
present age, the so called BRICS, have so impressed observers all over the world, that Italy’s 
experience with the reverse phenomenon has attracted much less foreign interest, until the 
Italian debt crisis of 2011. 
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This was not just because failure finds fewer students than success. Perhaps more because, 
even in Europe, so many things of greater interest have happened since the turn of the new 
century, that Italy’s plight to remain among the most developed countries in the world does not 
appear so notable and worthy of attention and study, especially because the decline of countries 
like the US and the UK is a much more important phenomenon for economists and other social 
and political scientists. 
More attention has attracted the phenomena of the grey economy and of the criminal 
economy. Here, foreign economists, anthropologists and sociologists have found a very large 
field to plough.  
It will however be some time before a Chinese Ruskin will bother to point to the 
abandoned factories of Prato, now enjoying a second coming with Chinese ownership and 
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